In 2015, Yeh proposed a lightweight authentication scheme with user untraceability. Yeh claimed that their proposed scheme is secure to an off-line password guessing attack. However, this paper points out that Yeh's scheme has the following security and efficiency problems unlike their claims: (1) The scheme is still vulnerable to off-line password guessing attack with stolen smart card. (2) The scheme has computational efficiency problem when the service provider authenticates the user sending message. For this reason, Yeh's scheme is insecure for practical application.
Introduction
A password-based authentication scheme provides an efficient and accurate way to identify valid remote users. Up to now, many password-based au-thentication schemes have been investigated in recent years for preserving secrecy of communication [1, 2, 3, 4] . Recently, Chang et al. [3] first introduced a formally provable secure authentication protocol with the property of useruntraceability. Unfortunately, Yeh [4] pointed out that Chang et al.'s scheme fails to provide the property of user-untraceability and is insecure against user impersonation attack, server counterfeit attack, and man-in-the-middle attack. Yeh also proposed a security enhanced authentication scheme to eliminate all identified weaknesses of Chang et al.'s scheme.
However, this paper points out that Yeh's scheme has the following security and efficiency problems [5, 6] unlike their claims: (1) The scheme is still vulnerable to off-line password guessing attack with stolen smart card [6] . (2) The scheme has computational efficiency problem when the service provider authenticates the user sending message [5] . For this reason, Yeh's scheme is insecure for practical application.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the Yeh's lightweight authentication scheme with user untraceability. The security flaws of Yeh's scheme are shown in Section 3. Finally, conclusions are given in Section 4.
Review of Yeh's Authentication Scheme
This section briefly reviews Yeh's lightweight authentication scheme with user untraceability [4] . There are three phases in the Yeh's scheme: user registration phase, user login and authentication phase, and password change phase. We outlined some notations used in this research paper.
• U i : Legitimate user
• S : Service provider
• ID i , P W i : U i 's identity and password 
User Registration Phase
The user registration phase performs as follows:
When a user U i wants to access the service of S, U i chooses and sends his/her identity ID i , password P W i , and two chosen random numbers r 1 and r 2 to S via a secure channel.
S →
After S receives the registration request, S computes the followings:
Finally, S stores parameters {N i , r 1 , M i , h(·)} into U i 's smart card and issues this smart card to U i securely.
3. At the same time, S stores h(h(y||r 2 )) without any information connected to U i . That is, S first deletes the registration information related to U i , and then maintains the secret value h(h(y||r 2 )) as a random number in a pre-defined table T ; hence, S cannot recognize U i via h(h(y||r 2 )) or any other information from this table.
Login and Authentication Phase
Assume that a user U i wants to login and authenticate to the service provider S. Fig. 1 depicts the Yeh's user login and authentication phase and it performs as follows:
When U i intends to access S, U i inserts his/her smart card into a card reader, and inputs ID i and P W i . The smart card then generates a robust strongly random number r 3 and then computes the followings:
Finally, the smart card sends {D, CID i , N i , C} to S through a public channel.
S →
Once S gets {D, CID i , N i , C}, S iteratively retrieves each value h(h(y||r 2 )) * from the maintained table T , and then computes the followings:
After that, S checks if C * equals C. If equal, U i is successfully authenticated. Next, S examines r * 3 , and if no login request with the same parameters {D, CID i , N i , C} is received within a predefined time interval. Once both conditions hold, this phase is passed. Otherwise, S immediately terminates this phase. Note that a threshold value of the number of cumulative failed requests can be set to 3. Then, S generates a random number r 4 and computes a as follows:
Finally, S sends {a, r 4 } to the smart card via a common channel.
3. Upon receiving {a, r 4 } from S, the smart card checks the freshness of r 4 . If r 4 is fresh in an expected time interval, the smart card computes a * as follows:
and compares a * with a. If values a * and a are the same, U i authenticates S.
Password Change Phase
The user password change phase performs as follows:
1. When U i wants to change the password, U i inserts the smart card into the card reader and keys in his/her identity ID i , password P W i , and a new password P W new i
. 
The smart card stores M Note that a threshold value of the number of cumulative failed requests can be set to 3. If the number of failed requests exceeds 3, the smart card will be locked and only a specific user reverification procedure can be used to unlock this smart card. This mechanism can be exploited to be secure against an off-line password guessing attack as the number of instances of password guessing and testing is limited.
Cryptanalysis of Yeh's Authentication Scheme
This section demonstrates that Yeh's lightweight authentication scheme with user untraceability [4] cannot withstand an off-line password guessing attack with stolen smart card [6] and has computational efficiency problem [5] .
Off-line Password Guessing Attack
An off-line password guessing attack is the most powerful attack to the passwordbased authentication schemes. In the off-line password guessing attack, an attacker uses a guessed password to verify the correctness of the password in an off-line manner [6] . The attacker can freely guess a password and then check if it is correct without limitation in the number of guesses.
Suppose that the attacker steals the parameters {N i , r 1 , M i , h(·)} from a lost smart card and knows the server S's response message {a, r 4 }. Then the attacker can perform an off-line password guessing attack to obtain the password P W i of the user as follows:
1. The attacker selects a candidate password P W * i .
The attacker computes
B * = N i ⊕ h(P W * i ||r 1 ).
4. The attacker computes a * = h(B * ||h(A * )||r 4 ).
The attacker checks if the following equation holds or not
If the check passes, then the attacker confirms that the guessed password P W * i is the correct one.
6. If it is not correct, the attacker chooses another password P W * * i and repeatedly performs above steps (2)∼(5) until a ? = a * * .
It is clear that if P W
Therefore, Yeh's scheme is vulnerable to the off-line password guessing attack. The algorithm of the off-line password guessing attack for getting the password P W * i is as follows:
The running time of the above off-line password guessing attack is (O(|D P W |)× 2T X × 3T H ), where T X and T H represent the execution time of bit-wise XOR operations and hash operations respectively. The search spaces D P W is unlikely to be large enough (for example, |D P W | ≤ 10 6 ), and the time complexities T X and T H all can be executed with negligible amount of time, thus the polynomial time-bounded attacker can find the exact password P W of the user easily [6] .
Computational Efficiency Problems
We can see that Yeh's scheme has computational efficiency problems when the service provider S verifies the user U i 's sending message [5] . That is, S must spend heavy verification computation times based on the received message to find the registered user U i from his/her user account table T .
To provide anonymity of the user U i in the Yeh's scheme, the identity ID i of U i is encrypted by using the shared secret value A = h(y||r 2 ) between U i and S as CID i = ID i ⊕ h(N i ||h(A)||r 3 ) in step (1) . Upon receiving the message CID i in step (2), S will decrypt it with the stored all secret value A = h(y||r 2 ) in T to obtain U i 's identity ID i , where 1 ≤ i ≤ n and n is the number of registered secret values in S. For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, S first will decrypt CID i by using N i , A = h(y||r 2 ), and r 3 to obtain ID i . And then S will verify whether ID i is the registered user U i from his/her user account table T by comparing C * ? = C. Therefore, S must perform four hash operations for each stored h(y||r 2 ) * in T . In this case, for n registered h(y||r 2 ) * in T , the maximum time complexity is O(4n) because the hash time complexity is O(4n).
Moreover, if an attacker modifies the message {D, CID i , N i , C} with a random message of same bit size and then sends it to S, the S cannot verify a legal identity ID i from his/her user accoun table T . Then, S will reject the forged message after performing O(4n) computation times. In this case, huge resource exhaustion problem will be occurred in S. Moreover, when the attacker sends n random messages to S, the S must perform O(4(n 2 )) computation times. Based on the above efficiency analysis, we can conclude that Yeh's scheme has computational efficiency problems because it has problems of large storage requirement and corresponding verification overheads.
Conclusions
This paper reviewed Yeh's lightweight authentication scheme with user untraceability and then pointed out that Yeh's scheme is still vulnerable to offline password guessing attack using stolen smart card unlike their claims and it has computational efficiency problem when the service provider authenticates the user sending message. For this reason, Yeh's scheme is insecure for practical application. Further works will be focused on improving the Yeh's scheme which can be able to provide greater security and to be more efficient than the existing lightweight authentication scheme with user untraceability by an accurate performance analysis.
